After creating the National Counterterrorism Center, following 9-11 terrorist attacks, it turns out no one's truly watching the terrorists-at least not specifically: no one government agency considers itself responsible "for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats." Translation: that's not my job.
Although the center was set up to analyze and integrate all intelligence regarding terrorism gathered or possessed by the government, the panel said, it found that no one agency considered itself responsible "for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats." A Senate Intelligence Committee report says the National Counterterrorism Center has failed to properly coordinate intelligence activities to detect the botched terrorist Christmas Day airline bombing.
The report states that the National Counterterrorism Center, created due specifically to September 11 terrorist attacks and designed to coordinate U.S. intelligence efforts, was "not organized adequately to fulfill its missions." The Christmas day bombing suspect Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab was allowed to board a flight bound for Detroit, Michigan, with an explosive device that fortunately failed to detonate. AbdulMutallab was detained only after airline passengers noticed his clothes burning, from his attempt to set off the bombing device that never detonated.
An additional report claims that the National Counterterrorism Center has failed to carry out even its basic mission. The center's "failure to understand its fundamental and primary missions is a significant failure and remains so today," write two Senators: Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-California, and ranking Republican Sen. Christopher "Kit" Bond of Missouri wrote the reports.
Although the National Counterterrorism Center center was set up to analyze and integrate all intelligence regarding terrorism gathered or possessed by the government, the panel said, it found that no one agency considered itself responsible "for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats" including the CIA. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, responded to the report by noting changes made following the Christmas 2009 incident, including creation of a National Counterterrorism Center Analytical Unit dedicated to following up on terrorist threat information. Blair's statement, however, noted that "institutional and technological barriers remain that prevent seamless sharing of information."; that's a lot of verbage for "we don't know what our other hand is doing."
In the main report released by Feinstein and Bond, criticisms cite a series of breakdowns in the preceding events to the attempt to blow up a United Airlines flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands, on Christmas Day. "The committee found there were systemic failures across the [government] intelligence community, which contributed to the failure to detect the [terrorist] threat," the report said.
The report also called technology across the intelligence community inadequate, a contributing factor to the failure in detecting the Christmas Day planned terrorist attack (our country which possesses some of the most techonological advancements is apparently lacking in terms of its own national security). It identified fourteen (14) "points of failure" in the Christmas day terrorist incident, most of which have been raised previously by intelligence officials: one of the scariest 'failures' includes a simple action by the State Department of not having properly revoked the suspect's U.S. visa, involving a breakdown in disseminating all information to key government agencies and the failure to conduct necessary searches for information.
In their addendum, Burr and Chambliss said the National Counterterrorism Center "failed to organize itself in a manner consistent with Congress' intent or in a manner that would clearly identify its roles and responsibilities necessary to complete its mission." The Center has been tracking terrorists as a team effort, without any clearly identified "lane of responsibility."Both the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center had necessary information to determine that a terrorist threat existed for the Christmas Day attack, but neither of the two government agencies identified its own specific information as a "threat stream."
"Overlapping efforts can help reduce the risk of one agency overlooking a threat, but these additional efforts cannot replace the need for one primary agency to have ultimate responsibility for this mission," the two senators wrote. Gee, ya think?